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A little over eight decades ago, Berle and Means’s (1932) seminal paper raised the 
daunting issue of agency problem stemming from the separation of ownership and control. 
Practitioners and academicians share common opinion that block-owners may effectively 
shrink the agency problem. By holding a significant share of the firm’s equity, block-owners 
are likely to have higher incentives to safeguard their investment over minority shareholders. 
Consistent with monitoring hypothesis of agency problem, a number of studies in last three 
decades provide empirical evidence on the benefits of block-ownership. Simultaneously, if 
monitoring is expensive and an easy low-cost exit is possible, block-owners may also 
exacerbate rather than solve agency problem. Alternately, block-owners can maximize their 
private benefits rather than firm value (Hirschman, 1970), and worse, they may even collude 
with managers to optimize their personal benefits at the cost of long-term firm value (Bushee, 
1998). Managers may also be tempted to withhold bad news since their performance and 
incentives are tied with stock prices (Kim et al., 2011). Jin and Myers (2006) argue that there 
is an upper bound to the extent of bad news that can be accumulated by managers. When the 
accumulation of bad news touches the threshold then it drains out at once and leads to a 
significant drop in stock prices. 
Therefore an important question to investigate is, “Do block-owners mitigate the risk 
of managerial expropriation (withholding bad news) through their monitoring role?” If block-
owners are apparent to be effective monitors, then their presence should diminish stock price 
crash-risk. Nevertheless, long-term benefits derived from effective monitoring are unlikely to 
align with the transient block-owners who are expected to hold stocks for short-term periods. 
Overall, the direction of the impact of block-ownership on crash-risk is debatable. In 
particular, we analyze how the incentives of managers to withhold bad news are influenced 
due to the presence of outside block-owners who have ability and motivation to monitor 
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managers. We focus on the emerging Indian market since investor risk is proportional to 
ownership concentration (LaPorta et al., 1998) and inside block-owners are likely to exercise 
inappropriate rights via complex ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2000). Since weak 
legal and regulatory institutions that offer inadequate protection to minority shareholders has 
led for a search of effective corporate governance mechanism, we believe that the role of 
block-owners has become more eminent as an external governance mechanism. 
In this paper, following popular literature (Kim et al., 2011), we use two proxies of 
firm-specific crash-risk: (1) the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific daily return 
and (2) log of down-to-up volatility of firm-specific daily return. We find that block-
ownership is positively and significantly related to one-quarter ahead crash-risk. We examine 
the impact of the investment horizon of block-owners on firm-specific crash-risk. Our 
empirical findings are in vein with monitoring hypothesis, i.e. dedicated long-term block-
owners minimize the propensity of crash-risk while transient short-term block-owners adopt a 
myopic firm-value inflation motivation. We next examine whether the presence of a lending 
bank deputed nominee on the firm's board moderate the relationship of block-ownership and 
crash-risk. Corporate finance theories postulate that the manager of a highly leveraged firm 
prefers high-risk projects with lower probability of success compared to low-risk projects 
with higher probability of success (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Generally in such firms, 
most of the benefits are cashed by the shareholders and most of the losses borne by the 
creditors. Basically lenders can discipline managers either by the threat of bankruptcy or by 
direct intervention in the decision making. Thus we study the direct role of lenders via bank 
nominated directors to discipline managers. 
These findings contribute to existing literature in several ways. One, several studies 
that relate overall block-owners with various parameters, viz. information efficiency 
(Boehmer and Kelley, 2009), firm-specific information (Brockman and Yan, 2009) and 
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corporate governance (Chung et al., 2010), show that institutional investors increase future 
crash-risk for developed markets but in this paper, we relate outside block-ownership with 
stock price crash-risk in the emerging economy where weak legal and regulatory efficacy 
offer inadequate protection to retail investors. Two, by focusing towards block-owners, our 
study adds to the literature that explains the complexity of the separation of ownership from 
control. Finally, we establish that in the presence of a weak institutional setup with a greater 
likelihood of expropriation, the role of creditors (banks) towards effective corporate 
governance is potentially far more critical. 
2. Data and variable construction 
2.1 Data 
Our sample period is from 2001 to 2012, covering the firms listed on National Stock 
Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange of India. Primary source of firm-level data i.e. both 
stock-prices and accounting data is obtained from the Prowess database compiled by the 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess also provides shareholding data of 
the firms on a quarterly frequency. After including quarterly observations for the firms with 
the firm-level equity, block-ownership shareholding, and accounting data available from 
Prowess, our final sample includes 45,878 firm-quarter observations. 
2.2 Measuring stock crash-risk 
Following Kim et al. (2011), we incorporate two measures of crash-risk – negative 
conditional skewness (NCSKEW) and down-to-up volatility (DUVOL) of firm-specific daily 
returns. Firm-specific daily returns are estimated using the natural log of one plus residual 
returns, denoted by W, from the following extended market model: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗 +  𝛽1,𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡−2 +  𝛽2,𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡 +  𝛽4,𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5,𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
Here 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is daily return of stock i on trading day t, and 𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡is daily market return (S&P 
NIFTY 500 index) on trading day t. In order to account for the effect of non-synchronous 
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trading, we include up to two days of lag and lead market return terms in EQ1. Next, for 
every quarter q, NCSKEW, a proxy for crash-risk, is estimated by dividing the negative of the 
third moment of quarterly firm-specific daily returns with the standard deviation of firm-
specific returns for firm i in quarter q: 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑞 =  −[𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
3
2 (∑ 𝑊1,𝑞
3  )/(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑ 𝑊1,𝑞
2 )
3/2
 ]              (2) 
Here n is the number of firm-specific return observations during quarter q. Conventionally, 
negative value of NCSKEW represents left-skewed stock return distribution. 
The second parameter for stock-specific crash-risk is down-to-up volatility 
(DUVOL). For each quarter, we compute average quarterly returns using firm-specific daily 
returns for ith firm. Next we identify a pool of daily returns in a specific quarter above the 
quarterly average as the up-day returns and below the quarterly-average as the down-day 
returns. Thereafter, DUVOL is estimated as the log of the standard deviation of the down-day 
returns to standard deviation of the up-day returns. By formation, the higher value of DUVOL 
indicates higher crash-risk. 
2.3 Measuring block-ownership 
The effect of the block-ownership (BLOCKOwn) of a firm on the future firm-specific 
crash-risk is calculated by summing-up the total percentage shareholding of all the investors 
in a firm, with equity-holding more than one percent off all the outstanding shares. We only 
account for more than one percent outstanding shareholding since fundamentally we are 
interested in analyzing the impact of the block-owners with sufficient access to management 
or have financial incentives to pursue their investment in the firm. Although, insiders’ viz. 
managers and promoters may satisfy our criterion of being block-owners, however their 
motivation of being block-owners and influencing the future stock price can be markedly 
different from outside block-owners. In order to avoid any form of internal biasedness, we 
purposely exclude managers and promoters from our block-ownership sample. We further 
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split the block-ownership (BLOCKOwn) variable into major (BLOCKMajor) and minor block-
owners (BLOCKMinor). Major block-owners are characterized as those with substantially high 
shareholding in the firm. 
2.4 Measuring short-term and long-term block-ownership 
To identify dedicated (long-term) block-owners from transient (short-term) block-
owners, we follow Bushee (1998) methodology. In particular, we classify block-ownership 
into short-term and long-term ownership on the basis of portfolio turnover over the past four 
quarters. We start by estimating aggregate purchase and sale i.e. churning rate (CR) for each 
block-owner on a quarterly basis using the following relation; 
𝐼𝑓 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞 > 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
𝐶𝑅 (𝐵𝑢𝑦)𝑞,𝑘 =  ∑ |𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1 ∗  𝑃𝑖,𝑞 − 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 ∗  𝑃𝑖,𝑞−1 − [𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 ∗ (𝑃𝑖,𝑞 −  𝑃𝑖,𝑞−1)]|          (3) 
𝐼𝑓 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞 =< 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
𝐶𝑅 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙)𝑞,𝑘 =  ∑ |𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1 ∗  𝑃𝑖,𝑞 − 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 ∗  𝑃𝑖,𝑞−1 − [𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 ∗ (𝑃𝑖,𝑞 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑞−1)]|    (4) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑞 and 𝑃𝑖,𝑞−1 are the stock's adjusted closing prices after taking into account the 
corporate actions at the end of two successive quarters q and q-1. 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞 and 𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 are 
number of stocks for the ith firm held by the kth block-owner at the end of two successive 
quarters q and q-1 respectively. Here, 𝐶𝑅 (𝐵𝑢𝑦)𝑞,𝑘 indicates the scenario when a specific 
block-owner increases his aggregate shareholding in a particular quarter from the previous 
quarter and vice-versa for 𝐶𝑅 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙)𝑞,𝑘. CR of each block-owner for quarter q is given as: 
𝐶𝑅𝑘,𝑞 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 {𝐶𝑅 (𝑏𝑢𝑦)𝑘,𝑞 , 𝐶𝑅 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙)𝑘,𝑞}/ ∑ {(𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑖,𝑞) + (𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑞−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑖,𝑞−1)}/2   (5) 
Next, we estimate the rolling average of the 𝐶𝑅𝑘,𝑞 over four quarters for the sample period. 
Finally, for each quarter we sort block-owners based on average churn rate (𝐶𝑅𝑘,𝑞). Top 33% 
block-owners are representative of investors with quick turnaround time, called short-term 
block-owners with a relatively shorter (transient) investment horizon in the firm (hereafter 
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BLOCKShort) while bottom 33% block-owners characterizes long-term block-owners with a 
relatively dedicated interest in the firm (hereafter BLOCKLong). To isolate the effect of block 
shareholding on firm-level crash-risk, we include several control variables that have been 
used as the related information proxies in the crash-risk literature and the description of these 
variables is given in table 1.  
[Table 1] 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the regressions 
based on firm-quarter observations between 2001 and 2012. The mean (median) value of one 
quarter ahead crash-risk measures – NCSKEWq+1 and DUVOLq+1 is -0.48 (-0.42) and -0.25 (-
0.26) respectively. Average shareholding of the block-owners (BLOCKOwn) in our twelve 
year sample period is 14.31%. We also find that on average short-term block-owners 
(BLOCKShort) hold 5.46% of total outstanding stocks, while long-term block-owners 
(BLOCKLong) own 10.66% of total outstanding stocks. 
[Table 2] 
3.2 Block-ownership and crash-risk 
In line with prior studies that examine the relation between block-ownership on future 
stock price crash-risk, we run the following regression: 
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑞+1,𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾
𝑂𝑤𝑛
𝑞,𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑞,𝑖
𝑛 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑. +𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑞,𝑖     (6) 
The dependent variable in above equation is measured for quarter q+1, while independent 
variables are measured for quarter q. Table 3 presents pooled regression results for popular 
firm-level crash-risk measures NCSKEWq+1and DUVOLq+1. We find a strong positive relation 
between block-ownership concentration of a firm and its future crash-risk for both negative 
skewness (0.30; t-stat=5.96) and down-to-up volatility movement (0.14; t-stat=5.92). When 
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we break down the block-ownership concentration among major and minor block-owners, we 
witness a significantly higher instance of crash-risk due to the presence of major block-
owners for next quarter NCSKEW (0.11; t-stat=2.14) and DUVOL (0.06; t-stat=2.58). 
Expectedly, we are unable to document any significant effect of minor shareholders in 
negatively influencing its stock price. These empirical findings nicely align with our key 
hypothesis i.e. a highly concentrated block-ownership in a firm will lead to a higher future 
firm-level crash-risk clearly indicating that block-ownership increases crash-risk. We 
interpret it as a strong evidence of expropriation of firm-assets by the block-owners. 
The estimated coefficient for BLOCKLong for negative skewness (down-to-up 
volatility) is -0.02 (-0.01) and is significant at one percent level. Contrarily, BLOCK Short only 
marginally influences the firm’s future chances of unexpected negative price movement. 
Here, we find a higher influence of dedicated investors on the future firm performance where 
they are likely to act as a watchdog in order to align the interest of the management in firm-
value maximization. 
 [Table 3] 
In our empirical examinations, we did not consider issues relating to any potential 
self-selection bias or endogeneity that might arise from the fact that either major block-
owners choose to invest in crash-risk prone firms or dedicated block-owners knowingly 
handpick firms with lower susceptibility to crash-risk for long-term investment. Another 
potential concern is reverse causality i.e. instead of level and investment duration of the 
block-ownership in the firm affecting the future firm-level chances of surprise negative stock 
movement; it is possible that the firm-specific sensitivity towards stock price crash causes the 
observed patterns in block-ownership. Although it is a widely anticipated generic problem in 
corporate finance literature, we assume that reverse causality is highly unlikely to drive our 
results since it is not at all obvious why major block-owners prefer to invest in firms prone to 
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crash-risk. Nevertheless, we conduct an additional test to address these concerns by 
regressing the change in firm-specific crash-risk measures on changes in the ownership 
variables. The first difference approach explicitly considers how change in specific type of 
ownership structure in the firm over two successive quarters influences the firm-level 
responsiveness towards crash-risk. Additionally, this model also mitigates the concerns 
related to the omitted variable and endogeneity from our model specification (Wooldridge, 
2006). In table 4, we present our results of change in dependent and explanatory variable 
regression. We find a positive coefficient of 0.35 (0.40) with significant t-statistics of 3.21 
(1.74) for change in ownership concentration – D_BLOCKOwn. However the effect dissipates 
when we split the ownership concentration into major and minor block-owners.  
[Table 4] 
3.3 Bank nominee board director and crash-risk 
Lastly, we examine the moderating role of a bank appointed nominee as a board 
director with respect to firm-level block-ownership and future crash-risk. Based on the 
presence of a bank appointed nominee(s) on the firm’s board, we categorize our sample into 
either Bank-Nominee group or No-Bank Nominee group. Bank Nominee group consists of 
those firms where at least one director has been nominated by the lending financial institute 
while the No-Bank Nominee group does not have any such board member. Table 5 shows the 
sub-sample regression results, and consistent with our prediction, we find the coefficient of 
BLOCKOwn is significantly positive only for firms that do not have a single bank designated 
nominee as a board member. It is evident in model 1 of Panel A-I and B-I that both future 
NCSKEW (0.25; t-stat=3.79) and DUVOL (0.11; t-stat=3.72) markedly increases in absence 
of bank nominee, wherein the firm’s odds of experiencing a stock price crash stems from its 
major block-owners. Expectedly, in the absence of a bank nominee, long-term external block 
shareholders continue with their role of monitoring the management. Next, as envisaged; in 
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the presence of a bank nominated board of director, we fail to find any evidence of block-
owners inflating the prospects of stock price crash. These statistical results also support 
monitoring hypothesis of agency theory. It suggests that in emerging markets, bank nominees 
can be an effective corporate governance mechanism to reduce firm-level agency issues.  
[Table 5] 
4. Conclusion  
In this study, we test three hypotheses. First, we examine if a highly concentrated 
outside block-ownership will increase the firm’s chances of crash-risk. After controlling for 
an array of firm-level factors which are highly sensitive to crash-risk, we find that crash-risk 
does increase with an increased ownership clustering and more in case of major block-
owners. Next, we find that dedicated long-term block-owners taking a superior monitoring 
role in alleviating the firm’s instances of witnessing a surprised decline in stock prices. Our 
final finding suggests bank nominees taking a disciplinarian role in firms with them as a 
board member since these firms do not witness or show any sign of crash-risk. Our findings 
are robust to a battery of sensitivity analysis, number of alternative model specifications, 
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Table 1: Variable description. 
 
Variables Definitions 
Negative skewness – 
NCSKEW 
Proxy for firm-specific crash-risk. It is the negative of the third moment divided by 
the standard deviation of quarterly firm-specific daily returns. 
Down-to-up volatility – 
DUVOL 
Proxy for firm-specific crash-risk. It is the ratio of the natural logarithm of the 
standard deviation of firm-level quarterly down-day up-day returns. 
Block-ownership – 
BLOCKOwn 
Total Percentage of quarterly shareholding for all the outside block-owners with 
1% or higher equity-holding in the firm. We discount the shareholding of the 
inside block-owners i.e. managers and promoters. 
BLOCKMajor & 
BLOCKMinor 
BLOCKMajor (BLOCKMinor) is the sum of quarterly firm-level block-ownership of 
all the outside shareholders with more (less) than median quarterly equity–holding. 
BLOCKLong & 
BLOCKShort 
BLOCKLong (BLOCKShort) is the sum of firm-specific long-term (short-term) 
quarterly firm-level outside block-ownership. 
Turnover change – 
DTURNOVER 
Relative change in stock–level turnover over two successive quarters where 
turnover is ratio of quarterly trading volume by total outstanding shares. 
Amihud illiquidity – 
Amihud 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor. 
Skewness – SKEW Quarterly firm–level skewness using daily returns. 
Volatility – SIGMA Quarterly firm–level standard deviation using daily returns. 
Stock return – RET Cumulative quarterly firm–level stock returns using daily returns. 
Kurtosis – KURTO Quarterly firm–level kurtosis using daily returns. 
Price to book – PB End of quarter market to book value of equity. 
Firm size – SIZE Natural logarithm of the end of quarter market value of equity, in Million Indian 
Rupees (INR). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the quarterly firm-level variables. N is the number of firm-quarters. 
 
Variables N Mean 5% Q1 Median Q3 95% Std. dev. 
 
Crash-risk Variables 
NCSKEWq+1 45,878 -0.48 -2.11 -0.96 -0.42 0.00 0.64 0.96 
DUVOLq+1 45,878 -0.25 -0.94 -0.53 -0.26 -0.01 0.32 0.45 
Block-ownership Concentration 
BLOCKOwn(%)  45,878 14.31 2.10 3.03 10.92 22.42 41.05 13.35 
BLOCKMajor(%) 45,878 14.60 2.10 5.99 11.73 19.72 36.53 12.05 
BLOCKMinor(%) 45,878 6.13 1.26 3.37 5.43 8.06 13.14 4.08 
BLOCKLong(%)  18,616 10.66 1.09 3.41 7.40 14.64 16.52 10.60 
BLOCKShort(%)  18,616 5.46 1.19 2.09 4.09 7.16 20.95 4.96 
Control Variables 
DTURNOVER  45,878 -0.03 -0.47 -0.059 0.00 0.05 0.40 0.78 
Amihud (x 10–6) 45,878 1.91 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 8.60 10.46 
SKEW  45,878 0.48 -0.77 0.00 0.42 0.96 2.02 0.98 
SIGMA  45,878 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 
RET(%) 45,878 0.24 -0.42 -15.07 -1.60 12.01 0.39 56.02 
KURTO  45,878 2.33 -0.77 0.15 1.14 2.96 9.14 4.48 
PB  45,878 2.47 0.28 0.68 1.31 2.60 6.86 13.78 
SIZE 45,878 8.17 5.22 6.72 7.99 9.51 11.81 2.03 
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Table 3: Regression results of one-quarter ahead crash-risk parameters on quarterly outside block-ownership. 
Robust t-statistics are calculated by dual clustering of the standard errors across firm and time. We control for 
year and industry fixed effects. 
 
 Panel A: NCSKEWq+1 Panel B: DUVOLq+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
BLOCKOwn 0.30***   0.14***   
BLOCKMajor  0.11**   0.06***  
BLOCKMinor  -0.03   -0.04  
BLOCKLong   -0.02***   -0.01*** 
BLOCKShort   0.03*   0.01* 
DTURNOVER 0.03*** 0.017** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
Amihud 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.001*** 0.004 0.005*** 
SKEW -0.06*** -0.068*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 
SIGMA 0.70*** 1.81*** -0.17 0.41*** 0.74*** -0.03 
RET 0.06*** -0.03 0.10*** 0.02** -0.01 0.03*** 
KURTO -0.01*** -0.013*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.01*** -0.023*** 
PB 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 
SIZE 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
Intercept -0.83*** -1.076*** -0.97*** -0.43*** -0.51*** -0.50*** 
       
Adj.  R2 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.08 
Observations 45,878 45,878 18,616 45,878 45,878 18,616 
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Table 4: Regression results of one-quarter ahead change in crash-risk parameters on successive change in 
quarterly outside block-ownership. D_NCSKEW (D_DUVOL) is the firm-specific successive change in 
negative skewness (down-to-up volatility) of the firm’s equity from quarter q-1 to quarter q.  
D_BLOCKOwn refers to the firm-specific difference in outside block shareholding in the firm. Refer notes 
in table 3 for the regression model details. 
 
 Panel A: D_NCSKEWq+1 Panel B: D_DUVOLq+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
D_BLOCKOwn 0.40*   0.35***   
D_BLOCKMajor  0.02   0.01  
D_BLOCKMinor  0.32   0.02*  
D_BLOCKLong   -0.15***   -0.47*** 
D_BLOCKShort   0.06   0.10 
DTURNOVER 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.04** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
Amihud 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 0.003* 0.001 0.000*** 
SKEW 0.88*** 0.65*** 0.90*** 0.38*** 0.26*** 0.38*** 
SIGMA -0.43 -1.82*** -0.87 -1.01*** -0.86*** -1.63*** 
RET 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 
KURTO -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.001 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01 
PB 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.001*** 0.006 
SIZE 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
Intercept -0.89*** -0.97*** -0.94*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.37*** 
       
Adj. R2 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.28 0.07 




Table 5: Regression results of sub-sample analysis of one-quarter ahead crash-risk on quarterly outside block-ownership for firms segregated based on the presence of 
Bank appointed nominee on the Board of the firm. Refer notes in table 3 for the regression model details. 
 
 Panel A: NCSKEWq+1 Panel B: DUVOLq+1 
 Panel A-I: No-Bank Nominee Panel A-II: Bank Nominee Panel B-I: No-Bank Nominee Panel B-II: Bank Nominee 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
             
BLOCKOwn 0.25***   0.12   0.11***   0.06   
BLOCKMajor  0.14**   -0.02   0.08***   -0.01  
BLOCKMinor  (0.14)   0.61*   -0.001   0.29*  
BLOCKLong   -0.16**   -0.34**   -0.10**   -0.15** 
BLOCKShort   0.24   0.29   0.12   0.15 
DTURNOVER 0.02*** 0.02* 0.031*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.02 0.01*** 0.100** 0.011*** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01 
Amihud 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.005 0.004** 0.004 0.003 0.001*** 0.006 0.003 0.004*** 
SKEW -0.05*** -0.06 -0.05*** -0.03* -0.06*** -0.04** -0.02*** -0.03 -0.02*** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.02** 
SIGMA 0.42** 1.88*** -0.26 0.30 1.47* -0.03 0.20** 0.71*** -0.03 0.18 0.74 -0.05 
RET 0.06*** -0.04 0.10*** 0.08** 0.03 0.09* 0.02*** -0.02 0.04*** 0.03 0.001 0.03 
KURTO -0.01*** -0.01 -0.001* -0.01* -0.01 0.01 -0.003*** -0.01*** -0.001*** 0.001* -0.01*** 0.02 
PB 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001* 0.003 0.003* 0.002 0.005 -0.006 0.002* 0.001 0.004 
SIZE 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
Intercept -0.87*** -1.04*** -0.92*** -1.10*** -1.24*** -1.13*** -0.44*** -0.49*** -0.49*** -0.54*** -0.57*** -0.53*** 
             
Adj. R2 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.06 
Observations 35,350 26,668 15,053 5,828 5,828 3,460 35,350 26,668 15,053 5,828 5,828 3,460 
 
